J.P. Lynch, World Report News - 13 September 2015
John P. Lynch earned his Master of Arts in Politics from the New School for Social Research in 2015, focusing on the politics of culture, identity, and ethnicity, especially those of East, Southeast, and Southern Asia. He formerly worked at the US Campaign for Burma.
This August, thousands of Rohingya tried to find protection from their flooding refugee camps at government shelters in Burma. The shelters turned them away. An estimated 100,000 Rohingya lost their homes, were injured, or died as a result (1). Why did this happen? And why were the Rohingya in refugee camps in the first place?
The answer boils down to colonialism and its economic, political, social, and psychological effects. In Burma today, these effects still live on in business restrictions based on ethnicity and religion, on the 1982 Citizenship Law (which grants citizenship based on whether one’s ancestors lived in Burmese territory before the First Anglo-Burmese War [1823]), and the ritualized, violent hatred of Muslims, exemplified by the 2013 Meiktila Massacre (15; 2; 3). It may seem like these examples point to ethnocentric nationalism as the ideological cause of the Rohingya’s persecution, but if we analyse the ruling regime’s explanation of how the Rohingya came to be in Burma, we find that ethno-nationalism rooted in colonialism.
Officially, the Rohingya are a Bengali people that came to Rakhine state illegally over the last few decades, though the regime admits that some came to Burma during British rule (4; 5). Thus the Rohingya are ineligible for Burmese citizenship and ought to return to Bengal, despite Bangladesh's refusal to (re)patriate them (5). However, local, regional, and Western records show the Rohingya have been living in Arakan, AKA Rakhine State, since at least the 8th century CE (5; 6; 7). They also show Arakan was peacefully multi-religious for much of its history, a characteristic that ended after the British invaded (7; 8). Like in Ireland, the British used incredible violence to extract as many resources as possible out of the colony (29). This included psychological violence, like the divide-and-conquer tactic where different penal codes were put in place based on arbitrary characteristics to sow distrust and enmity among people who might otherwise unite against the colonizer (28; 30). The British did this in Arakan by exploiting religious differences, and again in the whole of Burma based on geography. Both religion and region became British markers for what was legally termed “ethnicity” (28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33).
The ruling regime in Burma has claimed all of these historical records are fabricated (24; 25). This isn’t surprising. According to David Lowenthal’s work on heritage and history, this is because the regime lacks legitimacy and is reaching for fabricated heritage, a narrative of how a group of people came to legitimately inhabit a space, to deliver it (9). History, with its focus on complex reality instead of a single, coherent narrative, doesn’t deliver legitimacy. Instead, the history of colonialism, wherein social divides were created which now allow the ruling regime to continue its oppression of the Rohingya-- for as long as the regime continues using these colonial practices-- renders that regime illegitimate. Denying this history is an attempt to seize legitimacy where none exists, because in truth those systems were inherited from the British.
When the British left in 1948, there was no gradual transition of power, change in institutions, or refocusing of infrastructure. Divisive penal codes and social norms remained, established over a long, violent century of foreign rule (19; 20, 21). The Burmese regime mixed a tradition of violence with the ethnicized, regionalized Buddhism created by the British, and institutionalized their rule via mass media and education. According to their narrative, Burma is Buddhist country long ruled by Burman people and threatened by violent minorities and zealots on its periphery (26).
The Rohingya are so persecuted in Burma, along with Christians, Hindus, Karen, Kachin, Shan, and other minorities, because this narrative makes them a common enemy. It’s a tool to pit Buddhist, Burman, Central people against everyone else. That said, there is also a long tradition of discrimination and economic exploitation against Muslims, going all the way back to a massacre during the reign of Thaton King Mon in 1050 CE (19). However, in this and other situations, the kings who committed these acts later apologized, rescinded cruel laws, and actively tried to incorporate Muslims into society (20). Today’s systematic and time-enduring dehumanization of Arakan Muslims is new. It’s part of an inherited, colonial tradition of dehumanization, violence, and scapegoating. The regime keeps this system in place because that system keeps the regime in power.
Economically, politically, socially, and psychologically, the violence of colonialism has had incredible, long-lasting effects on Burma. One of those effects is the retooling of a general discrimination of Muslims into genocidal dehumanization. If we want to end the physical violence against the Rohingya, we must first consider the non-physical violence that legitimates their persecution, and then emulate other situations where that non-physical violence has been delegitimized. Only then will physical violence be illegitimate as well.
Continue Reading for follow-up interview conversations between World Report News and J.P. Lynch
This August, thousands of Rohingya tried to find protection from their flooding refugee camps at government shelters in Burma. The shelters turned them away. An estimated 100,000 Rohingya lost their homes, were injured, or died as a result (1). Why did this happen? And why were the Rohingya in refugee camps in the first place?
The answer boils down to colonialism and its economic, political, social, and psychological effects. In Burma today, these effects still live on in business restrictions based on ethnicity and religion, on the 1982 Citizenship Law (which grants citizenship based on whether one’s ancestors lived in Burmese territory before the First Anglo-Burmese War [1823]), and the ritualized, violent hatred of Muslims, exemplified by the 2013 Meiktila Massacre (15; 2; 3). It may seem like these examples point to ethnocentric nationalism as the ideological cause of the Rohingya’s persecution, but if we analyse the ruling regime’s explanation of how the Rohingya came to be in Burma, we find that ethno-nationalism rooted in colonialism.
Officially, the Rohingya are a Bengali people that came to Rakhine state illegally over the last few decades, though the regime admits that some came to Burma during British rule (4; 5). Thus the Rohingya are ineligible for Burmese citizenship and ought to return to Bengal, despite Bangladesh's refusal to (re)patriate them (5). However, local, regional, and Western records show the Rohingya have been living in Arakan, AKA Rakhine State, since at least the 8th century CE (5; 6; 7). They also show Arakan was peacefully multi-religious for much of its history, a characteristic that ended after the British invaded (7; 8). Like in Ireland, the British used incredible violence to extract as many resources as possible out of the colony (29). This included psychological violence, like the divide-and-conquer tactic where different penal codes were put in place based on arbitrary characteristics to sow distrust and enmity among people who might otherwise unite against the colonizer (28; 30). The British did this in Arakan by exploiting religious differences, and again in the whole of Burma based on geography. Both religion and region became British markers for what was legally termed “ethnicity” (28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33).
The ruling regime in Burma has claimed all of these historical records are fabricated (24; 25). This isn’t surprising. According to David Lowenthal’s work on heritage and history, this is because the regime lacks legitimacy and is reaching for fabricated heritage, a narrative of how a group of people came to legitimately inhabit a space, to deliver it (9). History, with its focus on complex reality instead of a single, coherent narrative, doesn’t deliver legitimacy. Instead, the history of colonialism, wherein social divides were created which now allow the ruling regime to continue its oppression of the Rohingya-- for as long as the regime continues using these colonial practices-- renders that regime illegitimate. Denying this history is an attempt to seize legitimacy where none exists, because in truth those systems were inherited from the British.
When the British left in 1948, there was no gradual transition of power, change in institutions, or refocusing of infrastructure. Divisive penal codes and social norms remained, established over a long, violent century of foreign rule (19; 20, 21). The Burmese regime mixed a tradition of violence with the ethnicized, regionalized Buddhism created by the British, and institutionalized their rule via mass media and education. According to their narrative, Burma is Buddhist country long ruled by Burman people and threatened by violent minorities and zealots on its periphery (26).
The Rohingya are so persecuted in Burma, along with Christians, Hindus, Karen, Kachin, Shan, and other minorities, because this narrative makes them a common enemy. It’s a tool to pit Buddhist, Burman, Central people against everyone else. That said, there is also a long tradition of discrimination and economic exploitation against Muslims, going all the way back to a massacre during the reign of Thaton King Mon in 1050 CE (19). However, in this and other situations, the kings who committed these acts later apologized, rescinded cruel laws, and actively tried to incorporate Muslims into society (20). Today’s systematic and time-enduring dehumanization of Arakan Muslims is new. It’s part of an inherited, colonial tradition of dehumanization, violence, and scapegoating. The regime keeps this system in place because that system keeps the regime in power.
Economically, politically, socially, and psychologically, the violence of colonialism has had incredible, long-lasting effects on Burma. One of those effects is the retooling of a general discrimination of Muslims into genocidal dehumanization. If we want to end the physical violence against the Rohingya, we must first consider the non-physical violence that legitimates their persecution, and then emulate other situations where that non-physical violence has been delegitimized. Only then will physical violence be illegitimate as well.
Continue Reading for follow-up interview conversations between World Report News and J.P. Lynch
