J.P. Lynch, World Report News - 13 September 2015
John P. Lynch earned his Master of Arts in Politics from the New School for Social Research in 2015, focusing on the politics of culture, identity, and ethnicity, especially those of East, Southeast, and Southern Asia. He formerly worked at the US Campaign for Burma.
This August, thousands of Rohingya tried to find protection from their flooding refugee camps at government shelters in Burma. The shelters turned them away. An estimated 100,000 Rohingya lost their homes, were injured, or died as a result (1). Why did this happen? And why were the Rohingya in refugee camps in the first place?
The answer boils down to colonialism and its economic, political, social, and psychological effects. In Burma today, these effects still live on in business restrictions based on ethnicity and religion, on the 1982 Citizenship Law (which grants citizenship based on whether one’s ancestors lived in Burmese territory before the First Anglo-Burmese War [1823]), and the ritualized, violent hatred of Muslims, exemplified by the 2013 Meiktila Massacre (15; 2; 3). It may seem like these examples point to ethnocentric nationalism as the ideological cause of the Rohingya’s persecution, but if we analyse the ruling regime’s explanation of how the Rohingya came to be in Burma, we find that ethno-nationalism rooted in colonialism.
Officially, the Rohingya are a Bengali people that came to Rakhine state illegally over the last few decades, though the regime admits that some came to Burma during British rule (4; 5). Thus the Rohingya are ineligible for Burmese citizenship and ought to return to Bengal, despite Bangladesh's refusal to (re)patriate them (5). However, local, regional, and Western records show the Rohingya have been living in Arakan, AKA Rakhine State, since at least the 8th century CE (5; 6; 7). They also show Arakan was peacefully multi-religious for much of its history, a characteristic that ended after the British invaded (7; 8). Like in Ireland, the British used incredible violence to extract as many resources as possible out of the colony (29). This included psychological violence, like the divide-and-conquer tactic where different penal codes were put in place based on arbitrary characteristics to sow distrust and enmity among people who might otherwise unite against the colonizer (28; 30). The British did this in Arakan by exploiting religious differences, and again in the whole of Burma based on geography. Both religion and region became British markers for what was legally termed “ethnicity” (28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33).
The ruling regime in Burma has claimed all of these historical records are fabricated (24; 25). This isn’t surprising. According to David Lowenthal’s work on heritage and history, this is because the regime lacks legitimacy and is reaching for fabricated heritage, a narrative of how a group of people came to legitimately inhabit a space, to deliver it (9). History, with its focus on complex reality instead of a single, coherent narrative, doesn’t deliver legitimacy. Instead, the history of colonialism, wherein social divides were created which now allow the ruling regime to continue its oppression of the Rohingya-- for as long as the regime continues using these colonial practices-- renders that regime illegitimate. Denying this history is an attempt to seize legitimacy where none exists, because in truth those systems were inherited from the British.
When the British left in 1948, there was no gradual transition of power, change in institutions, or refocusing of infrastructure. Divisive penal codes and social norms remained, established over a long, violent century of foreign rule (19; 20, 21). The Burmese regime mixed a tradition of violence with the ethnicized, regionalized Buddhism created by the British, and institutionalized their rule via mass media and education. According to their narrative, Burma is Buddhist country long ruled by Burman people and threatened by violent minorities and zealots on its periphery (26).
The Rohingya are so persecuted in Burma, along with Christians, Hindus, Karen, Kachin, Shan, and other minorities, because this narrative makes them a common enemy. It’s a tool to pit Buddhist, Burman, Central people against everyone else. That said, there is also a long tradition of discrimination and economic exploitation against Muslims, going all the way back to a massacre during the reign of Thaton King Mon in 1050 CE (19). However, in this and other situations, the kings who committed these acts later apologized, rescinded cruel laws, and actively tried to incorporate Muslims into society (20). Today’s systematic and time-enduring dehumanization of Arakan Muslims is new. It’s part of an inherited, colonial tradition of dehumanization, violence, and scapegoating. The regime keeps this system in place because that system keeps the regime in power.
Economically, politically, socially, and psychologically, the violence of colonialism has had incredible, long-lasting effects on Burma. One of those effects is the retooling of a general discrimination of Muslims into genocidal dehumanization. If we want to end the physical violence against the Rohingya, we must first consider the non-physical violence that legitimates their persecution, and then emulate other situations where that non-physical violence has been delegitimized. Only then will physical violence be illegitimate as well.
Continue Reading for follow-up interview conversations between World Report News and J.P. Lynch
This August, thousands of Rohingya tried to find protection from their flooding refugee camps at government shelters in Burma. The shelters turned them away. An estimated 100,000 Rohingya lost their homes, were injured, or died as a result (1). Why did this happen? And why were the Rohingya in refugee camps in the first place?
The answer boils down to colonialism and its economic, political, social, and psychological effects. In Burma today, these effects still live on in business restrictions based on ethnicity and religion, on the 1982 Citizenship Law (which grants citizenship based on whether one’s ancestors lived in Burmese territory before the First Anglo-Burmese War [1823]), and the ritualized, violent hatred of Muslims, exemplified by the 2013 Meiktila Massacre (15; 2; 3). It may seem like these examples point to ethnocentric nationalism as the ideological cause of the Rohingya’s persecution, but if we analyse the ruling regime’s explanation of how the Rohingya came to be in Burma, we find that ethno-nationalism rooted in colonialism.
Officially, the Rohingya are a Bengali people that came to Rakhine state illegally over the last few decades, though the regime admits that some came to Burma during British rule (4; 5). Thus the Rohingya are ineligible for Burmese citizenship and ought to return to Bengal, despite Bangladesh's refusal to (re)patriate them (5). However, local, regional, and Western records show the Rohingya have been living in Arakan, AKA Rakhine State, since at least the 8th century CE (5; 6; 7). They also show Arakan was peacefully multi-religious for much of its history, a characteristic that ended after the British invaded (7; 8). Like in Ireland, the British used incredible violence to extract as many resources as possible out of the colony (29). This included psychological violence, like the divide-and-conquer tactic where different penal codes were put in place based on arbitrary characteristics to sow distrust and enmity among people who might otherwise unite against the colonizer (28; 30). The British did this in Arakan by exploiting religious differences, and again in the whole of Burma based on geography. Both religion and region became British markers for what was legally termed “ethnicity” (28; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33).
The ruling regime in Burma has claimed all of these historical records are fabricated (24; 25). This isn’t surprising. According to David Lowenthal’s work on heritage and history, this is because the regime lacks legitimacy and is reaching for fabricated heritage, a narrative of how a group of people came to legitimately inhabit a space, to deliver it (9). History, with its focus on complex reality instead of a single, coherent narrative, doesn’t deliver legitimacy. Instead, the history of colonialism, wherein social divides were created which now allow the ruling regime to continue its oppression of the Rohingya-- for as long as the regime continues using these colonial practices-- renders that regime illegitimate. Denying this history is an attempt to seize legitimacy where none exists, because in truth those systems were inherited from the British.
When the British left in 1948, there was no gradual transition of power, change in institutions, or refocusing of infrastructure. Divisive penal codes and social norms remained, established over a long, violent century of foreign rule (19; 20, 21). The Burmese regime mixed a tradition of violence with the ethnicized, regionalized Buddhism created by the British, and institutionalized their rule via mass media and education. According to their narrative, Burma is Buddhist country long ruled by Burman people and threatened by violent minorities and zealots on its periphery (26).
The Rohingya are so persecuted in Burma, along with Christians, Hindus, Karen, Kachin, Shan, and other minorities, because this narrative makes them a common enemy. It’s a tool to pit Buddhist, Burman, Central people against everyone else. That said, there is also a long tradition of discrimination and economic exploitation against Muslims, going all the way back to a massacre during the reign of Thaton King Mon in 1050 CE (19). However, in this and other situations, the kings who committed these acts later apologized, rescinded cruel laws, and actively tried to incorporate Muslims into society (20). Today’s systematic and time-enduring dehumanization of Arakan Muslims is new. It’s part of an inherited, colonial tradition of dehumanization, violence, and scapegoating. The regime keeps this system in place because that system keeps the regime in power.
Economically, politically, socially, and psychologically, the violence of colonialism has had incredible, long-lasting effects on Burma. One of those effects is the retooling of a general discrimination of Muslims into genocidal dehumanization. If we want to end the physical violence against the Rohingya, we must first consider the non-physical violence that legitimates their persecution, and then emulate other situations where that non-physical violence has been delegitimized. Only then will physical violence be illegitimate as well.
Continue Reading for follow-up interview conversations between World Report News and J.P. Lynch
FOLLOW UP INTERVIEW
Does the state genuinely perceive the Rohingya as a threat to Burma? And if so in which capacities, and what is the reason behind that thinking?
The article makes it seem like the racist structure employed by the regime is a rational, premeditated, objective choice. That's quite possible-- but I know at least from limited experience with Burma that there is a deeply, passionately violent racism against the Rohingya, and I haven't seen much rational thinking when it comes to popular opinion among certain populations.
....
To answer your first question:
Yes - mostly. The rhetoric is built on both conscious and subconscious logic. The people who make up the ruling regime of Burma are largely conscious of the fact that they can direct social frustration and anger towards the rohingya instead of towards their regime, but many of these people grew up within this socio-political world divided and ranked based on region and religion. Some this rhetoric is coming from hatred and bigotry.
On the follow up:
Two reasons, the first being the rohingya are the easiest target. The Shan, Karen, and other groups have had violent, militarized independence movements for decades (centuries, even, if we dip into Burma's colonial history). The Rohingya, on the other hand, have been economically isolated and have largely attempted to live quietly in the territory, with most independence and autonomous movements being squashed before they could effectively organize or develop military competance. Moreover, that historical discrimination of Muslims primes folk in Burma to easily accept more intense bigotry.
And secondly... they kind of do pose a threat, more to the ruling regime's narrative than it's institutions. Like I mentioned in an earlier draft of the article, the presence of the Rohingya, and any historical investigation into their presence, tears apart the logic that holds together the "we are protectors" strain to the regime's legitimizing narrative. Demonizing them makes it less likely that people within Burma will enquire into their presence or past. However, they also form an economic threat in the potential for islamic radicalization and as the potential cause for sanctions with the West. That's one of the reasons the blatant genocide of the Rohingya stopped in the early 2010's and they were deliberately re-termed as "refugees," in an effort to keep the West's attention to a minimum.
The Rohingya aren't a direct threat, they're a liability.
....
Very interesting -- I'd like to be able to include some of this conversation in print, if that is alright with you. One last thing. You said the Rohingya are the easiest target for social frustration -- what are the sources of that frustration, or is it simply that the poor masses are looking for scapegoats and are already being raised in a racist society anyways?
...
You have my permission to include some of the conversation in print, no problem. As for the sources of that frustration?
You have a knack for asking good questions, succinct inquiries with huge answers.
I would say there are simultaneous general sources of pain and frustrations in addition to group specific sources. The general sources of frustration (those experienced by a large proportion of the population living in Burmese territory) include:
police brutality, pervasive corruption, exorbitant taxation policies, broken promises and agreements with the ruling regime (eg. the protesting farmers whose land was taken for Letpadaung Mine), blatant neo-colonial agreements with foreign investors (eg. Myitsone Dam), regular silencing and imprisoning of the Sangha (Buddhist monks, nuns, abbots, etc.), lack of sustainable jobs with livable wages, low quality of life, diverging norms and ideas between younger and older generations... the list goes on.
Other minorities' sources of frustration: living in fear of landmines, military bombing raids, systematic rape and torture, the international community's general disinterest of these groups' pain (eg. most folk know of the Rohingya or Aung San Suu Kyi, but how many know of the Shan, the Kachin, the Karen, or the Mon?), and peace agreements with the ruling regime that are largely meaningless (eg. the May 2015 bombing of Kokang separatists hiding in Yunnan, China).
Continue Reading to Review Citations for this Argument
Does the state genuinely perceive the Rohingya as a threat to Burma? And if so in which capacities, and what is the reason behind that thinking?
The article makes it seem like the racist structure employed by the regime is a rational, premeditated, objective choice. That's quite possible-- but I know at least from limited experience with Burma that there is a deeply, passionately violent racism against the Rohingya, and I haven't seen much rational thinking when it comes to popular opinion among certain populations.
....
To answer your first question:
Yes - mostly. The rhetoric is built on both conscious and subconscious logic. The people who make up the ruling regime of Burma are largely conscious of the fact that they can direct social frustration and anger towards the rohingya instead of towards their regime, but many of these people grew up within this socio-political world divided and ranked based on region and religion. Some this rhetoric is coming from hatred and bigotry.
On the follow up:
Two reasons, the first being the rohingya are the easiest target. The Shan, Karen, and other groups have had violent, militarized independence movements for decades (centuries, even, if we dip into Burma's colonial history). The Rohingya, on the other hand, have been economically isolated and have largely attempted to live quietly in the territory, with most independence and autonomous movements being squashed before they could effectively organize or develop military competance. Moreover, that historical discrimination of Muslims primes folk in Burma to easily accept more intense bigotry.
And secondly... they kind of do pose a threat, more to the ruling regime's narrative than it's institutions. Like I mentioned in an earlier draft of the article, the presence of the Rohingya, and any historical investigation into their presence, tears apart the logic that holds together the "we are protectors" strain to the regime's legitimizing narrative. Demonizing them makes it less likely that people within Burma will enquire into their presence or past. However, they also form an economic threat in the potential for islamic radicalization and as the potential cause for sanctions with the West. That's one of the reasons the blatant genocide of the Rohingya stopped in the early 2010's and they were deliberately re-termed as "refugees," in an effort to keep the West's attention to a minimum.
The Rohingya aren't a direct threat, they're a liability.
....
Very interesting -- I'd like to be able to include some of this conversation in print, if that is alright with you. One last thing. You said the Rohingya are the easiest target for social frustration -- what are the sources of that frustration, or is it simply that the poor masses are looking for scapegoats and are already being raised in a racist society anyways?
...
You have my permission to include some of the conversation in print, no problem. As for the sources of that frustration?
You have a knack for asking good questions, succinct inquiries with huge answers.
I would say there are simultaneous general sources of pain and frustrations in addition to group specific sources. The general sources of frustration (those experienced by a large proportion of the population living in Burmese territory) include:
police brutality, pervasive corruption, exorbitant taxation policies, broken promises and agreements with the ruling regime (eg. the protesting farmers whose land was taken for Letpadaung Mine), blatant neo-colonial agreements with foreign investors (eg. Myitsone Dam), regular silencing and imprisoning of the Sangha (Buddhist monks, nuns, abbots, etc.), lack of sustainable jobs with livable wages, low quality of life, diverging norms and ideas between younger and older generations... the list goes on.
Other minorities' sources of frustration: living in fear of landmines, military bombing raids, systematic rape and torture, the international community's general disinterest of these groups' pain (eg. most folk know of the Rohingya or Aung San Suu Kyi, but how many know of the Shan, the Kachin, the Karen, or the Mon?), and peace agreements with the ruling regime that are largely meaningless (eg. the May 2015 bombing of Kokang separatists hiding in Yunnan, China).
Continue Reading to Review Citations for this Argument
Works Cited
(1) BBC News - Aug 2 2015 - “Myanmar Floods: UN says death toll ‘to rise’ “
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-33750690
(2) Human Rights Watch - Discrimination in Arakan - 2000 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm
(3) Physicians for Human Rights - May 2013 - Massacre in Central Burma: Muslim Students Terrorized and Killed in Meiktila https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Burma-Meiktila-Massacre-Report-May-2013.pdf
(4) Amnesty International - “Why are the Rohingya Fleeing Burma?” - May 2015 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/05/why-are-the-rohingya-fleeing-myanmar/
(5) Kei Nemoto - 2012 - The Rohingya Issue: A Thorny Obstacle between Burma (Myanmar) and Bangladesh) http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Kei_Nemoto-Rohingya.pdf
(6) The Transnational Institute - Feb 2014 - Ethnicity Without Meaning, Data without Context https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/ethnicity-without-meaning-data-without-context
(7) Bailey Wallys Diffie - 1997 - Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580 - U Minnesota Press
(8) Michael Syms, Esq. - 1800 - An Account of an Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava, Sent bt the Governor-General of India, in the Year 1795 - in Soas Bulletin of Burma Research Vol 4. Issue 1 Spring 2006 - http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs09/4.1Symes-red.pdf
(9) David Lowenthal - 1998 - “Fabricating Heritage” - History & Memory, Vol 10, No. 1 Spring - http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54694fa6e4b0eaec4530f99d/t/54d12bb6e4b026f68f18b3ae/1422994358865/Lowenthal%2C+History+%26+Heritage+1998.pdf
(15) Burma Campaign UK - March 2013 - “Burma Briefing: Examples of Anti-Muslim Propaganda” - No. 21 http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/images/uploads/Examples_of_Anti-Muslim_Propaganda.pdf
(19) Pe Maung Tin and G. H. Luce - January 1960 - The Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma - Rangoon University Press
(20) Ba Shin - 1961 - Lecture at Asia History Congress, New Delhi: Coming of Islam to Burma down to 1700 AD
(21) Antoni Slodkowski - May 2015 - “Beaten and starving, some Rohingya flee boats, return to camps,” - Reuters - http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/us-asia-migrants-rohingya-idUSKBN0O524F20150521
(24) Sarah Kaplan - May 2015 - “The serene-looking Buddhist monk accused of inciting Burma’s sectarian violence,” - The Washington Post - http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/27/the-burmese-bin-laden-fueling-the-rohingya-migrant-crisis-in-southeast-asia/
(25) Lucy Wescott - May 2015 - “Who Are the Rohingya and Why Are They Fleeing Myanmar?” - Newsweek - http://www.newsweek.com/who-are-rohingya-and-why-are-they-fleeing-myanmar-330728
(26) William F. S. Miles - 2014 - Scars of Partition: Postcolonial Legacies in French and British Borderlands - U of Nebraska Press.
(28) Richard Potter - July 2015 - “Myanmar: New Front in an Old War,” - The Diplomat - http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/myanmar-new-front-in-an-old-war/
(29) Conn Hallinan, ed. John Gershman - Oct. 2005 - “Divide and Conquer as Imperial Rules” - Foreign Policy in Focus - http://fpif.org/divide_and_conquer_as_imperial_rules/
(30) D.G.E. Hall - 1981 - “A history of Southeast Asia,” - Macmillan Asian History series, 4th ed, London
(31) Tint Swe, Nirmala Carvalho - 2009 - “Myanmar, the regime’s policy of “divide and conquer” against minorities,” - Asia News - http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Myanmar,-the-regime%E2%80%99s-policy-of-divide-and-conquer-against-minorities-16178.html
(32) Martin Smith, Annie Allsebrook - 1994 - Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democracy, and Human Rights - No.8 ASI’s Human Rights Series - http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Ethnic_Groups_in_Burma-ocr.pdf
(33) Oxford Burma Alliance - 2012 - “Ethnic Nationalities of Burma,” - http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/ethnic-groups.html
More References (for background info, though not directly related to what’s in the article):
(10) http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/who-really-has-power-in-burma/
(11) Smith, Martin (1991). Burma — Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London and New Jersey: Zed Books
(12) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/violence-flares-myanmar-border-area-china-150210130307305.html
(13) http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1807353,00.html
(14) http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-govt-says-public-service-journalists-see-propaganda.html
(16) Dorothy Roberts, Fatal Invention
(17) Victoria Hattam, In the Shadow of Race
(18)
Yegar, Moshe The Muslims of Burma: a Study of a Minority Group, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1972
(22) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html
(23) Thornton, Russel (1 June 1992). William L. Anderson, ed.Demography of the Trail of Tears. University of Georgia
(27) http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21654124-myanmars-muslim-minority-have-been-attacked-impunity-stripped-vote-and-driven
