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The Myth of Homogeneity in Japanese Race Relations, Demographic Momentum, and Projected Economic Role

6/21/2012

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ALLISON HIGHT - 22 JUNE 2012

When China last surpassed Japan’s economic output to become the second largest economy in the world in 2010, reactions in Japan were mixed: while many celebrated the success of a fellow East Asian country and acknowledged China’s role in the development of their own economy, others regretted the regressive fall.  Although the change in placement was due more to China’s relentless growth than any major shortcoming of Japan, it does serve to add to the world’s growing conviction that Japan may not possess the resources necessary to remain competitive in an increasingly globalized society.  In the past several decades, the country’s population growth has slowly leveled out, peaking in 2005 at 127.7 million, and is expected to decline to 105 million by 2050 (Usui 37).  This decline includes a distinct shift in demographics, for as the latest baby boom generation passes the age of sixty-five and women have fewer and fewer children than in the past, an increasingly large elderly population is becoming dependent on a shrinking working body.  Currently, there are approximately three workers to support every elderly retiree; by 2025, that number is expected to fall to two, a far cry from the 11:1 ratio that existed in the 1960s (40-41).  Still, although the numbers look bleak, by themselves they do not necessarily spell out Japan’s economic ruin.  Rather, it is the addition of Japan’s strict immigration policy that severely limits its ability to compensate for this demographic shift with foreign workers that bodes ill for the country’s future global competitiveness.  Indeed, “[t]he Japanese government, which adheres to the myth of Japan as an ethnically homogenous nation that is not and never has been a country of immigration, has one of the most restrictive immigration policies among advanced industrialized nations” (Tsuda 13).  Although so far “Japan is an international anomaly in that it succeeded in its post-war industrialization and economic modernization without depending on foreign labor” (Brody 32), many believe that its restrictive policies are finally about to backfire.  At the heart of the country’s strict laws is the cherished ‘myth of homogeneity’ that firmly believes in the value of a one-size-fits-all culture, language, and ethnicity.  Within the context of this myth, then, this paper explores the research question, what role has Japan’s pure ethnic perception played in their immigration policy in the past and how will it affect its future role in world affairs?  Because we live in a time that is rapidly becoming globalized, it is crucial to examine this question to understand the different future roles Japan has the potential to play and how the country should proceed to reach the most desirable outcome for both itself and the world as a whole.

The myth of racial homogeneity arose naturally because of Japan’s 200 year isolation period.  Of course, after opening its borders again, the country’s past policies of separation were not immediately followed with strong movements to integrate foreigners into society or immediate globalize, so it has been relatively simple to maintain a culture of perceived ethnic “purity.”  Today, the “Japanese national identity built around the notion of racial purity and cultural integrity developed in part because of Japan’s geographical isolation as an island nation and in part because of conscious political efforts to create a mythology of a ‘pure’ ethnic nation” (31).  This idea mainly manifests itself in two ways: first, there remains today a strong societal value of homogenized behavior as well as culture.  There is little emphasis placed on the individual, and people instead derive their worth and usefulness from their ability to work as part of a team.  Uniforms are widely used in both early education and the adult workforce, and form is emphasized over function to acknowledge people’s commitment and duty to those around them.  Second, “[e]thnicity, language, and culture are the keystones of Japanese self-image and national identity” (32), and the discourse surrounding each of these three elements necessitates discussion of the other two as well.  During the colonial movement, for example, the government justified its exploits by emphasizing the unique superiority of the Japanese ethnic identity that was composed of several different Asiatic races and cultures (Shin 332).  Because the Japanese language contains a similar mix of various Asiatic influences, this idea became bound up in both the language of the people and the nation’s domestic cultural practices as well.  Today, the three elements are so closely intertwined that they are practically interchangeable, and each is still considered an integral part of the Japanese identity.

This myth of homogeneity has had profound influences on Japan’s immigration policy and foreign worker populations over the years.  Although occupants of many different countries have had difficulty integrating into Japanese culture both culturally and lawfully, the two groups of Koreans and Nikkeijin have been particularly affected because of their relatively large numbers.  First, during the colonial era, harsh policy made it impossible for many Koreans to continue their occupation as subsistence farmers, forcing them to search for employment in Japan instead (Mori 156).  Most of the workers who came to the country were young men who intended to stay only long enough to save some money and therefore had little motivation to integrate into Japanese society or compete for high-level jobs.  This population segment became more firmly established in the 1930s when Korean women were recruited for work in Osaka’s spinning industries and families began to take root.  By 1940, the number of Koreans living in Japan exceeded 1.2 million (157-158).  When the country had its independence restored in 1952, however, Japan denied this ethnic group citizenship status, even for those who had at this point resided in the country for decades as a result of the country’s colonial legacy.  The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act of the same year provided a limited avenue to citizenship, but then only as one of eighteen categories of foreigners that in many ways only served to reinforce their social status as ‘outsider’ (2).  Even after the country’s 1990 Immigration Reform, which slightly improved foreigners’ integration into the cultural framework of Japan, some still make a strong argument that

[o]fficial immigration and immigrant policy in ‘ethnic citizenship regimes’ suggests that ethnicity is the critical factor in framing questions of membership [. . .] [E]ven those long-settled in the country like [. . .] the Korean minority in Japan, are discouraged, through restrictive policies on naturalization, from becoming citizens.  They are, regardless of the length of their stay and intentions to remain in the country, always ‘foreigners’ since they are ‘unassimilable.’  It is ethnicity rather than language, culture, or even religion that bars these residents from full inclusion in society.  (Brody 28)

While this argument does reinforce the strong Japanese connection between ethnicity, language, and culture, because it also contains the implication that it is possible to acquire at least the latter two – providing a small window for potential assimilation – it emphasizes the strength of the Japanese insider/outsider binary and how easily both of these factors are trumped by ethnicity.  Debora Ortloff further explains that Japan’s immigration policy has “traditionally been based on jus sanguinis, the principle that one’s nationality at birth is the same as that of one’s biological parents.  These boundaries of nationality and citizenship close the door to many long-term, non-national residents” (447), including not only the Korean population but also those of Chinese descent who also began their residency prior to WWII and in some cases, the small population of mixed ethnic descent.

Even those who did manage to naturalize continued to face discrimination in the workplace, including companies that blatantly refused to hire workers of Korean descent (Shin 226).  This strong discrimination had the interesting effect of forcing many Koreans to hide their national background, for “[a]s a means of survival, many immigrants submitted themselves to cultural assimilation. Many used Japanese names, a legacy of Japanese colonial assimilation policy, to disguise their ethnic identity to avoid overt racism” (Shin 336).  Today, some parents still shelter their children from the knowledge of their original ethnic descent in the hopes that ignorance will smooth the way for assimilation and integration.  Although this technique has proven successful in many individual cases, overall it adds to the insider/outsider dichotomy, because “[t]he marginality of these colonial immigrants and their acculturation created an illusion of Japanese homogeneity which helped to reify the new Japanese national self-image as a homogeneous nation and justified the exclusionary structure of Japanese society” (336).  If the only perceived way to become an insider is to renounce any remnant of non-Japanese ethnicity, even foreigners who do manage to naturalize will not be able to help bridge the divide between the two, simply because their naturalization will not be visible to either the individual or the government.  Though unique because of its members’ long residential status in Japan, the Korean struggle for inclusion is representative of all foreigners’ hardships.

Nikkeijin – or foreigners of Japanese descent – though the literal opposite of long-term Korean residents in terms of ethnicity of belonging and homeland, have had remarkably similar experiences when attempting to naturalize to the country.  These individuals began to enter in large numbers after the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in response to a growing need for foreign workers to fill in gaps left by the native population.  In the past, Japan had explicitly prevented unskilled workers from immigrating to the country, and although the 1990 reform did not wholly change this stipulation, it did create a “back door” method through which unskilled workers could enter (Brody 41).  Although this slight policy change allowed over 300,000 Nikkeijin to return to Japan, the majority coming from Brazil, little national effort was put forth to smooth the workers’ integration into the country.  As these individuals began to enter in large numbers, two contradictory positions on their perceived role in Japanese society arose.  First, there existed a widespread assumption that integration and transition for these individuals would prove simple, and there would soon be little difference between Nikkeijin and Japanese nationals.  This idea ultimately proved false.  Despite their ethnic background, many of the Nikkeijin were several generations removed from their Japanese origins, and although a number had enrolled in Japanese language classes back in Brazil, the language barrier proved a large obstacle to their assimilation (Ortloff 453).  Japan did revise their “Lifelong Learning Promotion Law” in the same year as their immigration reform to promote adult learning, but they failed to provide any adjustments to cater to the needs of the newly-arrived foreign workers.  As a result, even though Nikkeijin were not subjected to the racial discrimination and hiring bias that the Koreans suffered, because they were largely unskilled coming in and were forced to remain so because of the strict language and cultural barriers, they were restricted to the margins of society, filling no role but that of the manual laborer by which they had originally been tempted.  Second, however, the 1990 Immigration Act that paved the way for the Nikkeijin’s migration exhibits calculated exclusion.  The Act expanded the number of 1951 immigrant categories from eighteen to twenty-seven, and one of those added carried the exclusive label of Nikkeijin.  As Shin argues, “[b]y creating a differentiated visa category exclusively for Nikkeijin, the Japanese state attempted to maintain its national self-image as a racially and ethnically homogenous nation” (338).  Contrary to what was advertised to the foreigners, this “suggests that [the national government] view[ed] the Nikkeijin as short-term guest workers rather than residents” (Ortloff 458), a mindset only exacerbated by some of the Nikkeijin’s own personal beliefs that their stay in Japan was temporary (461).

Ultimately, neither one of these attitudes proved positive in welcoming and integrating the Nikkeijin into Japanese society.  The former, that of assumed integration, was not only demonstrative of the Japanese government’s tendency to view “foreign workers strictly as labor power to be regulated and not as people with human rights and needs” (Tsuda 4), but in the specific case of the Nikkeijin, was a further indication of the extreme emphasis placed upon ethnicity in Japan and the perceived connection between ethnicity, culture and language.  Because the Nikkeijin had Japanese roots, people presumed that their ethnic background would automatically fill in any cultural gaps and often refused to change their mind about the matter even as this assumption proved sadly false.  The second attitude strongly reinforced the idea of Japanese ethnic purity.  Arguably, under the ideas and ideals of the country, the group of people easiest to integrate into Japanese society would be foreigners of Japanese descent.  To create an atmosphere where not even these individuals are welcome in the long term is to emphasize cultural purity as well as ethnic purity.  The Japanese population in Brazil was large enough and existed for short enough a time that many people stayed within the bounds of the Japanese community and did not intermarry with Brazilians.  Although theoretically this could have provided the opportunity for the Japanese government to see returners as still ethnically “pure,” they chose instead to focus on the different cultural influences – for WWII-era assimilation policies caused many to adopt Brazilian practices and beliefs – and in doing so, created an even stricter set of criteria for people to fulfill to be considered properly Japanese (Ortloff 453).

Even as developing solutions for ethnic and racial difficulties remained largely ignored on the national level, though, local movements have gained considerable precedence in the last several decades.  Exemplary among these efforts has been the establishment of the “Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreign Population,” an organization that “unites sixteen cities in their efforts to deal with immigration issues” (Tegtmeyer Pak 68).  Since its formation in 2001, the Committee has made deliberate efforts to emphasize the value of foreign workers’ contributions to Japanese society and to create potential avenues to nation-wide policy changes.  Adult education programs are also developing on the local level to incorporate the needs of foreign residents, and, tellingly, there is a direct correlation between “the availability of adult education services” and “the degree to which foreign residents [. . .] have been accepted and incorporated into the existing social service and educational infrastructure” (Ortloff 460) because “where there are long-standing and dominant national languages, language proficiency is the first step toward political, economic, and cultural participations” (450).  As one would expect, language acclimation largely affects residents’ comfort level in society, quality of relationship with fellow community members, and potential to rise higher in the workforce, so while these programs are still small, they have already had significant positive effects on individuals and communities.

In context of Japan’s economic status and rapidly aging population, though, critics, scholars, and politicians argue that these small, local efforts are far from what Japan needs to stay competitive on the global market.  These carefully measured groups of foreigners brought in to work temporarily may stabilize the country for a time, but data analysts predict that if Japan’s economy and population continue to grow at a similar rate, there will be a labor shortage of 10 million workers in 2025 and 20 million in 2050 (Mori 92).  To compensate, the same number of foreign workers would need to be brought in at the rate of approximately 400,000 workers per year.  While this would certainly stimulate the economy and provide opportunities to both provide greater care for the elderly population and turn around overall population decline, the approach is highly controversial and would certainly transform current Japanese society more drastically than anything past changes have done.

However, there is also much debate over whether such a radical plan is even feasible in the current set-up of Japan.  Because of the strong cultural values of homogeneity and the group over the individual, Japanese middle schools, for instance, are sites of incredible “assimilationist pressures and deculturalizing education for non-Japanese students” (Ortloff 449).  Few bilingual schools exist (Brody 110), causing many foreign children to be sent outside of the country for education purposes, and those that do exist are usually either incredibly expensive or volunteer run.  Adult foreigners report “language difficulty, isolation, and prejudice as their primary concerns at work” (64) and housing discrimination based on status and ethnic background is rampant.  Further, “[f]oreigners, or gaijin, are seen as so completely outside of Japanese society that their rights have generally not been addressed in Japanese law” (6), and as a result, they hold very little political power.  All of these issues are only “compounded in Japan by a general unwillingness to even acknowledge the substantial non-Japanese population, and by underdevelopment of research, education, activist, and political organizations to address and push for solutions for Japan’s foreign populations” (Ortloff 464).  Of course, an influx of 20 million foreign workers would act as a natural catalyst to change, and no doubt currently marginalized segments of the population would gain much influence as their numbers increased.  To what extent would the Japanese government start such efforts, though, and to what extent would foreigners have to demand that they be given rights?  The answer remains unclear.  Although the current Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, has expressed interest in attracting more and diverse foreigners to the country, as of yet his words sound little different from the lip service that politicians have given the issue in the past.  It appears that the nation stands at a crossroads: “The effects of the globalization of international economies, as well as the globalization of human rights norms, have caused a collision in Japan between traditional conceptions of membership and citizenship on the one hand, and new policy initiatives promoting ‘internationalization’ on the other” (Brody 1).  It remains to be seen in which direction Japan will proceed and how they will strike a balance between tradition and modernity.

One final possibility does remain: if job conditions grow as dire as data analysts currently predict they will, there is a high likelihood that the events of the 1980s, when Japan last had a large shortage in the labor market, will repeat themselves: the country will experience large amounts of illegal immigration (3).  Although more difficult to enter than most countries considering its island status, the prospect of people increasingly overstaying their visas is a tangible outcome of the current situation.  Though certainly not the most desirable of options, especially considering Japan’s past history of extremely harsh treatment of discovered illegal foreigners, it is one of many possible turns of events that the government will have to consider when moving forward in the years to come.

Considering its strength throughout the years, it seems unlikely that the belief in the value of Japanese homogeneity will disappear anytime soon, even if large amounts of foreign workers are brought into the country.  In the past, this conviction has driven the nation’s immigration policy, educational approaches, and behavioral norms.  While preserving the perceived purity of Japanese blood is certainly desirable on several levels, especially considering the long and rich history of the people, it may finally be time to push past the boundaries of ethnicity and embrace the integrative aspects of globalization that appear to be becoming increasingly inevitable.  Although as the Nikkeijin can attest, such integration will not be easy, and tensions and supremacy struggles are bound to arise, it may be the best option if Japan wants to continue to thrive on a global level.


Works Cited

Brody, Betsy.  Opening the Door: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Globalization in Japan.  New

York: Routledge, 2002.

Mori.  Hiromi.  Immigration and Foreign Workers in Japan. New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc.,

1997.

Ortloff, Debora Hinderliter and Christopher J. Frey.  “Blood Relatives: Language, Immigration,

and Education of Ethnic Returnees in Germany and Japan.”  Comparative Education Review 51.4 (2007): 447-470.  Web.

Shin, Hwaji.  “Ethnic Legacy of Ethno-Racial Inequality in Japan.”  Theory and Society 39.3/4

(2010): 327-342.  Web.

Tegtmeyer Pak.  “Cities and Local Citizenship in Japan: Overcoming Nationality?”  Local

Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective. Ed. Takeyuki Tsuda. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006.

Tsuda, Takeyuki. “Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local

Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration.”  Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective. Ed. Takeyuki Tsuda. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006.

Usui, Chikako.  “Japan’s Demographic Future and the Role of Foreign Workers.” Local

Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective. Ed. Takeyuki Tsuda. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006.


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Japan's Nuclear Energy Future

10/14/2011

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ALLISON HIGHT - 14 OCTOBER 2011

After Japan’s former prime minister Naoto Kan took a decidedly anti-nuclear stance at the end of his term, it appeared as if the country could soon be heading in the direction of weaning off their dependence on nuclear energy.  When his successor, Yoshihiko Noda, was elected from the same political party, the relatively new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), there was a distinct hope that the government’s stance on nuclear power would continue along the same trajectory.

Within weeks of Noda’s inauguration speech, that hope remained shaky at best.

Following the March 11th, 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, there arose a call as never before to end Japan’s dependence on nuclear energy.  This call was echoed in many other countries as well, most notably Germany, who has pledged to phase out their power plants by 2022.  Kan responded by taking an anti-nuclear stance and saying that Japan should engage alternate solutions to replace the energy produced by their fifty-four power plants.  However, so vicious was the governmental backlash from his comments that he was forced to retract his words as a personal opinion instead of the official party stance on the issue.  After he left office, the team of researchers assembled to address the repercussions of the Fukushima nuclear plant meltdown was disbanded.

Though Noda began his term in office by agreeing to produce a new energy plan in the next year to reduce Japan’s dependence on nuclear sources, higher-ups in the DPJ who have expressed anti-nuclear opinions find themselves distinctly in the minority, despite that fact that polls demonstrate that seventy percent of the Japanese people are in favor of alternate energy sources (up significantly from pre- March 11th numbers).  The government and the people, then, are divided to such an extent that rare public protests have occurred in the last few months in an attempt to pressure the DPJ to change their stance on the issue.

However, past party policies and actions do not make it clear what position the DPJ should take.  Established in 1996 and expanded in 1998, the DPJ was originally created in response to the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to serve as a voice for the people.  Valuing small businesses, self-sufficiency, foreign relations, and environmental protection, the party has attracted left-leaning, middle and lower-class citizens, many of the same people who wish to phase out nuclear energy.  Although one of the DPJ’s seven proposals is to “lead the world in global environmental protection” by “promot[ing] the use of renewable energy,” their current trajectory seems to be leading them in the opposite direction.  Recently, not only has Noda agreed to reopen approximately two-thirds of the power plants that were closed following Fukushima’s fallout, but he is also planning to sell nuclear power technology to several other countries, including Vietnam, Lithuania, Turkey, and the United States, a decision that has left many questioning the government’s true future intentions in regards to energy sources.

Supporters of nuclear use argue that the DPJ’s support of healthy environmental policy falls right in line with their endorsement of the power plants.  Indeed, when compared to other power sources, uranium usage is currently leading in dual efficiency and cleanliness, as it generates several million times more power than coal and petroleum when used in equal amounts, while producing a fraction of the carbon dioxide emissions.  However, the long-term effects of nuclear by-products may prove even more devastating than atmospheric deterioration, as the waste produced by the uranium reaction takes thousands of years to reach safe levels of radiation.

 The appropriate stance for the DPJ to take on the future of nuclear power, then, depends on how long-term the party wishes to think and whether they place more emphasis on the energy demand today or the burden of radioactive waste for future generations.  Considering the recent political situation in Japan, it is not surprising that they are currently choosing to concentrate on the immediate need: in the past six years, Japan has had the same number of prime ministers come in and out of office, to the extent that most Japanese people no longer bother to keep track of the name of even the current minister.  With the country still in upheaval, there is no evidence that Noda will break this trend.  As there seems to be little use, then, in forming long-term plans without guaranteed time to implement them, Noda is focusing on what he sees as the best option for the people right now.

As in any political process, though, support for his actions is vital for significant progress to occur, no matter the direction.  Though the majority of the people are not yet recovered enough from Fukushima to support the revitalization of the nuclear industry, causing Noda’s approval rating to steadily decrease – currently at 55% and dropping – a more immediate obstacle is the DPJ’s rival party, the LDP.  Though the DPJ holds 106 seats in the upper body of legislation, the House of Councilors, the LDP is not far behind at 83.  With a total of 242 seats in the House, both parties hold a significant enough amount of power to severely delay or stop any bills Noda wishes to push through.  The LDP is already calling for more debate on the future of nuclear power, arguing that whatever the end result may be, more time is needed to discuss any and all possibilities.  However, like the DPJ, they, too, are split among themselves on the issue, making its future even more uncertain.

Clearly aware that his current plan of action is unpopular with Japan’s citizen population, Noda has placed considerable emphasis on the tests that are being done to ensure further safety of the country’s nuclear plants before they are reopened.  Though he claims that the tests are rigorous, it is highly doubtful that they can simulate the effects that another earthquake of the same magnitude as the one on March 11th could cause.  Additionally, recent research produced by University of Tokyo professor Yoshinobu Tsuji that a tsunami up to twice as high as for what the city is prepared could hit the Hamaoka nuclear power plant has only served to further turn popular opinion against nuclear power.

 Noda, then, will have to tread very carefully in the weeks and months to come.  The scale of the Fukushima disaster clearly acted as a catalyst to invoke Japan’s public fervor, and unlike for past issues, the people are not willing to consign the country’s nuclear fate solely to the hands of the government.  The two will remain at odds, then, until a compromise is reached: whether the people or the prime minister will have to give more, though, remains to be seen.
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Iwate, Japan's Industries Remain Grounded From Tsunami, But Its People Stay Strong

10/2/2011

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ALLISON HIGHT - 2 October 2011

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 Loud caws of crows echo across the unnaturally empty landscape; water splashes quietly as volunteers wade through the mud of the river; a man’s clear voice sounds out across both as he speaks of how every effort of cooperation is one step closer to international peace: this is the state in which Iwate, Japan finds itself today.

On March 11th, 2011, the infamous 8.9 earthquake and subsequent tsunami that hit Japan struck coastal towns the hardest.  Among these was Iwate, a town located not far from the country’s east coast that is heavily dependent upon the fishing industry.  On that day, over half of Iwate’s livelihood was destroyed in the form of boats, ports, and supplies.  Over six months later, the town is still working to rebuild their homes, businesses, industries, and communities.

Although far enough from Fukushima’s nuclear plants that increased levels of radiation were not a serious concern, Iwate has had its fair share of trouble.  Only in the last month were the last of its evacuation shelters emptied; temporary housing is still prevalent as gaping holes and ghost foundations serve as reminders of the homes that used to stand on the same land.  The recent typhoon also caused mudslides and additional evacuation for people who had been assured that their temporary homes had been built on safe ground.  Economic stress has been added to the emotional and traumatic strain as the dire condition of Iwate’s fishing industry stretches into November’s peak sea snail season and boats remain stranded on land or in piles of rubbish.

Like in many other disaster zones, though, the perpetually admirable spirit of perseverance and steadfast determination remains very much alive in the people of Iwate, an attitude which has caused many to stay in the area despite the barren landscape in order to rebuild their community anew.  With worldwide attention waning away from Japan, and when present, focused mainly on the progress of radiation quell, the stories produced in areas like Iwate go largely unheard.  One such story lies in the work done by the non-governmental organization “Life Investigation Agency” (LIA).  Established in 2010, LIA works to end illegal animal trades and halt environmental abuse.  After the tsunami, LIA immediately jumped in to do environmental-related rehabilitation work to repair the damage done to Japan’s ecosystem.  For example, when the waters swept onto the land, many of the trees on the lower hillsides were immersed in salt water; today, these trees stand as brown beacons of what transpired.

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While LIA can do little for what has already died, they are not short of volunteers to heal what is only damaged.  One of their most recent projects is to clean Iwate’s six rivers.  Each day, groups of thirty to fifty volunteers pull on nagagutsu – Japanese high rubber boots – and wade out into the shallows.  Armed with spades and tight-knit bags, they shovel off the top layer of dirt that was washed into the river during the tsunami, pick out any leaves, stones, or trash, deposit the dirt into the bag, and repeat the process for hours.  After the dirt settles, the procedure is repeated several times in the same area.  Even after this stage of the process is completed, the oil that remains on top of the water must be removed by different means.

Unfortunately, despite the rampant trash and sludge that washed into the river, many areas cannot be touched, as various wildlife is building their nests amongst the metal and plastic.  As LIA’s primary concern is for the well-being of the plants and animals, they are waiting for an opportune time to approach these areas, a process that will take several years before it is concluded.

Seeing dozens of people working so painstakingly day after day in such a small area to complete a project whose end date has yet to be determined gives one a glimpse of the scope of the disaster: if this much effort must be put in to restore one small part of the landscape to its former condition, how much must be expended before the entire country returns to how it once was?  And long will it take?

Surprisingly, efforts like LIA’s may lie at the heart of the answer to this question.  While much foreign and national news coverage has converged on the human side of the story all along, the voices of environmental organizations have grown steadily louder in recent months.  Currently, Japan stands as a crossroads: despite their renowned recycling and disposal system, the overwhelming amount of clean-up work to be done opens the possibility for irresponsible removal and placement of waste, a decision that could have devastating effects on the country in the future; in contrast, the environmental clean-up being done currently could be taken a step further to prepare the land for possible future disasters.  Restoring crops and landscapes to a thriving condition would have the added bonus of affecting Japanese citizens’ day-to-day conditions for the better as well.  Especially in Iwate and surrounding regions, where mountains and picturesque scenery is rampant, the value of environmental restoration should not be underestimated.

Fortunately, many people and organizations are reaching out to Japan to accomplish this goal.  Among the most encouraging is the International Union for Conservation of Nature, which appears more than willing to share its knowledge and resources in order to assist Japan in necessary scientific and environmental endeavors.

In the days after the earthquake, while the rest of the world was still discussing the scope of the disaster, Japan was posting positive Twitter stories demonstrating the constant stream of citizens’ selfless actions, its nation-wide desire to help evacuees, and steadfast evidence that the country would rebuild in very short order.  Today, that attitude persists in its ideal in Iwate’s readiness to accept strangers into their midst for the sake of reconstruction, their eagerness to share their lives and their stories with anyone who is willing to listen, and their ability to take a disaster of incomprehensible scope and turn it into an opportunity for friendship, bonding, and building.

Even in view of the sheer amount of work left to be done, then, Japan’s future is definitely looking more positive every day.  Between national and international endeavors, it appears that the events of March 11th may cause the country to emerge even stronger and more resilient than before.

But of course, Japan knew that from day one.

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A Look Back at Japan's Earthquake

8/27/2011

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27 AUGUST 2011 - ALLISON HIGHT - A look back at how the dangers of nuclear power emerged and changed Japanese society in the aftermath of the earthquake -
                  In the weeks and months following Japan’s March 11th earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, government officials greatly downplayed the scope of the calamity.  While the life-or-death battles at the plants themselves received wide news coverage, the subtler spread of nuclear material was mostly kept out of the public view: ironic, considering that it was the public being affected.

                  Only now, nearly six months after the first tremors were felt, are the people finally becoming privy to the information that they should have had all along.  While the government claims that the information was not released because of its original inconclusiveness, experts disagree, saying that in the hands of the right people, pertinent data could have at the least altered evacuation patterns and water usage, saving countless people from being exposed unnecessarily to high levels of radiation.  Precautions can now be taken, of course, but the damage has been done.

                  The withheld information, weak excuses, and seriousness of the health risks have caused the Japanese to perform an act of extreme unconventionality in their society: speaking out loudly against the government.  Usually trusting and respectful in their relationships with authority, the desperateness and confusion of the situation has had citizens calling for Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s resignation for several months now, as most of the blame for misinformation has been directed at the imprudent actions of he and his officers.  While attempting for a time for regain his public image by calling for the end of Japan’s dependence on nuclear power, Kan has finally bowed to the people’s request and plans to leave office within the week.

                  While Kan’s departure will ease the ferocity of most of the attacks against the government, the question remains as to what his leaving will mean for the future of nuclear material in Japan.  While Kan certainly made numerous mistakes in dealing with the national disaster, public dissent acted as a catalyst for him to make the first moves to phasing out nuclear power, a shift loudly applauded by many long-time opponents of the energy source who until this time have gone unsupported.  As many of the frontrunners to replace Kan as Minister are showing a pro-nuclear stance, this change in government leadership could push the anti-nuclear movement back to square one.

                  Of course, government elites are no longer the only ones who have a say in this debate.  Far removed from the previous general apathy with which Japanese citizens treated the presence of nuclear power in their country, the public is becoming more informed about its potential effects and, as a result, taking a decidedly negative stance on the issue.

                  However, it is just as possible that once a new Minister takes office, in typical Japanese style, the people will revert to their former state of trust in the government, confident that a new regime will bring the honestly and change for which they hope.  Most likely, the future attitude of the citizens will depend upon the new Minister’s first few actions: if he or she confronts the state of the nation with a free spread of information and distinct efforts to isolate the people from the nuclear effects, Japan may once again return to normal.  If instead he or she continues in the same vein as Kan, however, with presentation of ambiguity and false assurances, the leaders of the anti-nuclear movement may have enough ammo to keep the people riled against a future dependent on nuclear power—only time will tell.

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    ABOUT THE AUTHORS: FAR EAST / SOUTH EAST ASIA:

    Baron Laudermilk is the CSO of the organization and also works as a financial analyst based out of Beijing. His work considers Chinese domestic policies and U.S. policy options in the Far East world.
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