A Featured Essay for the Autumn 2011 Quarterly Release
by Director Matthew Bishop (Ohio, U.S.A.) and Far East Asia Regional Director Baron Laudermilk (Beijing, China)
Edited by Director Matthew Bishop

ABSTRACT:
The 2012 Foreign Policy Action Plan covers grand strategy and particular policy suggestions for Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and also engages ideas for reforming global governing, judicial, and economic institutions.

BIO:
Matthew Bishop is the Founder and Director of World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs, Managing Editor for this release and the chief author of this document. His concentration is in the rhetoric of social and political change. Baron Laudermilk is the Far East Regional Director and Chief Secretary of the journal and a regular staff researcher and writer. His focus is in Chinese government and economy.

28 AUGUST 2011 - MATTHEW BISHOP
The Coming of a Palestinian State: A Summary of Arguments for the Established Independence of Palestine and an Exploration of the Flawed Argument Against that Establishment

1: A Practical Look

Palestine does not require the approval of the UNSC to become a state. The United States is therefore, from a technical point of view, unable to forbid the formation of a Palestinian state. Palestine has embassies and ambassadors around the world at this moment, and many nations already recognize its sovereignty. This September, a majority of the world’s countries will recognize Palestine’s sovereignty and independence in the forum of the United Nations General Assembly. And yet the ever-lethargic United States will not be moved. AIPAC is as strong as ever, and against the vast majority of the world’s populations, the vast majority of the world’s nations, and the vast majority of the dictates of international law, the United States now stands almost entirely alone in proclaiming that Palestine may not hold sovereign status.

The coming of a Palestinian state is not something that the United States has the power to prevent. It is something which will come with the general consensus of everyone and everything from the world’s most powerful nations to its least empowered individuals in every corner of the world. It is therefore inadvisable for the United States to remain in opposition of an independent Palestine, and necessary that the US Congress recognize Palestine as a sovereign state this coming September-- at the latest.

2: A Moral Look

The issues of human rights which revolve around the arguments of Palestine’s sovereignty should be familiar to anyone who keeps up with such events. The label of “sovereign” will, we all hope, grant an ear to those whose complaints have been unheard, the complaints of those Palestinians who are forced to endure violations of their natural rights every day of their lives, people who are born into a life where they must accept that they, as people, are not worth as much as Israelis. Recognizing Palestinian statehood will bolster the legitimate complaints of those who suffer violations of human rights and international law every day. Furthermore, we hope it will bring the crimes of Netanyahu into the open light, crimes which offend Israeli and Palestinian alike, and any other conscious human being.

In summary: From a legal standpoint, the United States is powerless to prevent the coming of an independent Palestine this September. From a moral standpoint, the United States is in fact obligated to recognize an independent Palestine. From a practical standpoint, even should the United States remain fervently opposed to an independent Palestine, an independent Palestine will come all the same—the world has already made up its mind, with or without the United States. It is, then, inconceivable that the United States should refuse to recognize an independent Palestine, and yet the lobbyists and religious zealots behind the opposition remain firm, and hide behind the most vulnerable defense: “we oppose such a unilateral move”.

3: The Argument Against an Independent Palestine

They refer, of course, to the “unilateral move” of Palestinians to proclaim their independence. It is not, in fact, a “unilateral move” when more than four of the almost seven billion of the world’s people and more than 2/3 of the world’s nations proclaim their support for an independent Palestine (as many as 170 of the UN’s 192 nations are expected to proclaim support for a sovereign Palestine, with 2/3 being the lowest estimate). It is not “unilateral” to follow the dictates of international law or the declarations of the United Nations. There is nothing in any way “unilateral” about the Palestinian bid for statehood, and yet pro-Israeli pundits hide behind this fallacy-ridden argument time and time again.

It is “unilateral” to presume that Israeli law may ignore human rights. It is “unilateral” to presume that Palestinian issues can be handled exclusively by an Israeli government. It is “unilateral” to presume that Palestinians have no legitimate voice, and that a coalition of US and Israeli politicians may say what is and is not right for a Palestinian nation.

I might also remind our readers that America’s independence was, in fact, a unilateral movement, and that even if I had simply made up all of these arguments, those who oppose an independent Palestine would do well to take a history class before making such terribly unfounded accusations. They suppose that unilateral movements are inherently unjust. The Palestinian bid for statehood, requiring the majority consent of the world, is the furthest thing possible from “unilateral”, but even were this not true, their bid for statehood could not be regarded as unjust simply for being a unilateral movement—which again, it is not.


4: A Brief Look into the Costs of the US-Israeli Alliance and Why Things Don't Change

The United States has been hiding behind its pro-Israeli arguments for far too long. Religious, political, economic, and strategic interests have all kept the US-Israeli alliance firm. But every moment of this alliance has in fact worked against long-term economic, political, and strategic interests of the United States. This alliance has come at the cost of positive US-Muslim relations in every corner of the world. It has isolated entire segments of the world’s populations. It has caused countries from the poorest to the richest to publicly proclaim the United States as a nation which thinks itself above international law, a nation which has destroyed any idea of human rights. This alliance has cost us more than three billion USD a year. It has cost the lives of dozens of thousands of unarmed Palestinians. It has cost us a potential alliance with the new democratic governments emerging across the Middle Eastern and North African world, democracies which now regard the United States as a backward and tyrannical nation unfit to be trusted. This alliance has manifested in the Taliban, al Qaeda, and an ISI which is more interested in cooperating with a terrorist than with a US Senator. It has manifested in the soul of every person who is raised to hate the United States by being shown video clips of American-made, American-funded bombs on American-made, American-funded planes destroying Palestinian homes, villages, and refugee camps—and then being told the truth: That these planes and bombs are approved year after year by the US Congress, and every year they are used by an Israeli government against an almost-Palestinian-nation which lacks the ability to keep itself alive.

Israel has treated the United States as an inferior: While the United States sends messages to Netanyahu’s Israel time and time again, condemning illegal Israeli settlement policies, Netanyahu, knowing that the United States Congress cannot really stand up against the Israeli foreign lobby, continues with settlement policies. As soon as the US condemns Netanyahu, he issues another statement proclaiming the establishment of more illegal settlements in Palestinian land, and if a US Congressman does not jump up to applaud Netanyahu’s flagrant abuse of power, he or she is attacked by the Israeli lobby.

Meanwhile, Palestinians and Israelis alike live in a world where it is illegal to express social or political dissent, where they are prohibited from gathering in public to protest Israeli policy. They live in a world where if they protest the ambitious designs of the Israeli government, they are more likely to be run over by an Israeli bulldozer and called a “terrorist” than to be remembered by the world as who they were and what they stood for. This is the real cost of our alliance.

In summary of those last two paragraphs: While US Congressmen feel trapped by the Israeli lobby, Palestinians and sympathetic Israelis alike feel just as trapped by their own abusive governments.

5: Conclusions

We have explored the downsides of the alliance and recognized that its expenses are huge. The arguments against US support of an independent Palestine do not withstand even the most minimal level of scrutiny. There is, furthermore, in fact every reason to support a Palestinian state, from an economic, political, legal, pragmatic, or strategic point of view. Even if all of this were not true—even if this entire essay was, in fact, entirely devoid of truth—it is still plainly impossible for the United States to alone withstand the will of all the other nations and all the other people of the world. Palestine will become a nation. The United States can accept it or not, but to not accept it will be nothing less than another crime added to its record—a crime which the emerging nations of the new Middle East and North Africa will not easily forget—a crime which the imminent Palestine will remember forever.

MATTHEW BISHOP
MAY 20 2011

An Interview with Professor of Terrorism Dr. Marc Scarcelli

The views expressed here are mostly those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Dr. Scarcelli unless explicitly stated.

I. Structural and Strategic Look into Al Qaeda and the Information from Bin Laden's Compound

Despite finding of plans to sabotage US railways and the discovery of large amounts of intelligence, including nine hard drives, in Bin Laden's compound, there is a prevailing view that Bin Laden was not active in commanding Al Qaeda from his home north of Islamabad. Proponents of this second view cite facts like Bin Laden's courier coming and going only once every two months. Dr. Scarcelli shares this views. Bin Laden, Scarcelli proclaims, was essentially "in retirement". Symbolically, he was important-- but that was his greatest role. Yet he did play a role in reducing infighting among the Tehreek-e-Taliban, and with Bin Laden gone an increase in infighting is possible. In any case, operationally, says Dr. Scarcelli, Al Qaeda will be more focused in Yemen, Algeria, and Somalia in the years to come.

Ayman al-Zawahiri cannot become the symbol that Osama Bin Laden was, but he can replace him as the figurehead of Al Qaeda, and probably will. Dr. Scarcelli says, however, that it is probable that the information gained from Bin Laden's compound will lead to Zawahiri's capture or death. In light of the recent attempt on Awlaki's life, it seems plausible to me that the information from Bin Laden's compound did at least lead to a link pointing at Awlaki.

As far as recruitment goes, the death of Bin Laden could be a positive or negative factor-- recruits could join honoring Bin Laden as a martyr, or they could abstain from joining, seeing as Bin Laden was in fact caught and killed by the United States. That is much the same pattern for states-- that is, states may be more reluctant to harbor terrorists, they may resist with more energy, knowing that the United States is willing to violate their sovereignty and is capable of executing quick military missions inside that country. Conversely, a nation could consider that the United States has apparently no regard for state sovereignty and takes ten years to track down its worst enemies, and so hold the United States in lower esteem and in effect be more receptive to terrorists coming in and coopering with the state.

Yet if we throw patterns of state cooperation and recruitment into context, we have to ask how much of an audience Al Qaeda actually enjoys in an age where activists across the Middle East are demanding more moderate and representative governments. Many people have expressed concern that Al Qaeda could "hijack" a revolution-- this concern is perhaps most vivid in Libya-- but the fact remains that the majority of uprisings are directed against the sort of tyranny which Al Qaeda would institute were it to ever assume power as an actual state. The democratic revolutions, in short, are not receptive to Al Qaeda-- and Al Qaeda is not receptive to the revolutions, having recently reiterated its position of being decidedly anti-democratic and against democratic uprisings. Given recent events there is an emerging line of thought stating that if Al Qaeda cannot appeal to a newer, younger, more democratic generation, then they have no future. Yet the political agenda of Al Qaeda cannot be dismissed, at least not the part of its agenda which is in common with the agendas of organizations like Hamas and Hizbollah-- the complaints of these groups should be addressed in conjunction with US support for nonviolent democratic movements which are right now still gaining popularity across the Middle East.

II. Foreign Policy: Palestine

Hamas does not want to enfranchise Al Qaeda. Their mourning of Bin Laden's death was symbolic, and not actual, in that Hamas is still decidedly separate from, unaffiliated with, and at times in open rivalry against Al Qaeda. The issues statements in praise of Bin Laden, Dr. Scarcelli asserts, could, furthermore, actually distance the more Al Qaeda-leaning individuals and thrust more moderate individuals within Hamas into the fore of the political arena. Perhaps inadvertently, Hamas has opened the door to letting their more moderate members gain more clout, and by idolizing Bin Laden has created a separation within themselves. Regardless of to what extent this separation may exist, or of how profound it may be, this is an opportune time for the United States to cater to more moderate individuals within Hamas, to play up the mutual US-Hamas dislike of Al Qaeda, and, furthermore, to support the nonviolent democratic movement within Palestine while at the same time condemning joint Israeli-Palestinian crackdowns of joint Israeli-Palestinian protests, thereby strengthening the political constituency which will be most in favor of an also-strengthened newly-moderate Hamas.

Realistically, Dr. Scarcelli asserts, a U.S. politician cannot criticize Israel and expect to win reelection, even when that criticism is necessary to create a more stable and peaceful environment in the Levant. Yet in light of the recently bridged gaps between Hamas and Fatah, in light of the coming proposed UNSC Resolution this September, and in light of a world which is increasingly aware of the human rights violations committed by Israel and of a moderate Palestinian youth whose protests are nonviolent and aimed at legitimate reform, it seems to me that regardless of "American ignorance", as some have called it, it is time for politicians across the board to step up-- against the lobbyists and the media-- and proclaim their support for measures which will lead to legitimate, peaceful, and lasting reform. The events which have occurred in recent history, during this past year, and in the wake of Bin Laden's death, I think, make this an opportune time to switch gears.

III. Pakistan: Foreign Policy and a Look at Internal Dynamics

Dr. Scarcelli is sure that the ISI and perhaps the military was at very least complicit in Bin Laden's hiding. Many analysts, knowing the circumstances and the evidence surrounding Bin Laden's death, are of the same opinion. The ISI and Pakistani military have been allied with the Taliban for decades. There are, in fact, certain officers within the ISI who also operate as trainers at Al Qaeda camps. As one of the sharpest intelligence networks in the world, it is almost inconceivable that the ISI did not know of Bin Laden's whereabouts.

Of course, that does not mean that the government-- or the president for that matter-- were aware of this. The ISI has the capacity to operate independently of the Pakistani civilian government and could have held this information from them. Given the fact that Bin Laden lived so close to a military school and compound, this is actually a reasonable proposal. It is not unlikely that someone in the government knew, but to suspect that the entire government knew-- and to suspect that the president knew, for that matter-- may be presuming too much. The death of Bin Laden may bring to the surface old rivalries between the military/ISI factions and the civilian government. Pakistan, already a country divided, has become even more heated in light of Bin Laden's death, and more divided than they already were.

For the United States, there are not a lot of options available. It is obvious that letting nuclear Pakistan become a failed state is not a plausible option-- funding cannot be terminated. It would only make bad problems worse. Yet the ISI is unlikely to drastically alter its allegiances. Most recently, Pakistan allegedly released the name of a supposed CIA operative who was directing CIA operation in Pakistan-- and so presumably oversaw the SEALS operation. That, Dr. Scarcelli says, was Pakistan's way of getting back the United States, however meaningless it may be in comparison. Yet for the United States, Dr. Scarcelli agrees, there is little one can do-- except avoid being naive about the issues surrounding Pakistan. The ISI and many military factions may be decidedly anti-United States; yet that does not mean that the US does not have any audience inside the Pakistani government. It does suggest, in any case, that as suspicious as we were before this incident, we should be more suspicious after it. At the same time we should try to ensure that the divisiveness inside Pakistan does not disintegrate into civil war-- we cannot, therefore, marginalize any large sector of the military or ISI.

Dr. Scarcelli also brings up that fact that it seems almost impossible that Pakistan is uninvolved with the Afghanistan drug trade, the prosperity of which is in part due to the lengthy conflict in that country. In a sense, one might conclude, the longer violence reigns in Afghanistan, the longer Pakistan will have an economic incentive to be complicit in that violence-- and again there are factions loyal to the Taliban and factions loyal to Al Qaeda. Violence in Afghanistan, however, cannot simply be solved with an influx or a withdrawal of troops.

IV. Conclusions

The optimists are hailing Bin Laden's death as the end of Al Qaeda. The decentralized network, now without its most central figurehead and in the midst of the Arab Spring, will be unable to sustain itself and largely disabled. Dr. Scarcelli, along with a great many scholars, refutes this. Al Qaeda does not require the nod from Bin Laden-- Al Qaeda is a network of cells trained with the capacity to operate independently. Furthermore, Al Qaeda does not even require a central command-- the influence of Al Qaeda is enough to gain recruits who sometimes will act on their own, without even having been trained. Bin Laden's death, in the most real view, is perhaps entirely symbolic-- in which case we must consider that symbolic acts can have real and lasting effects. Yet the events and circumstances surrounding his death merit our attention, in that on many stages they have the capacity to change the way we do act-- or change the way we should act-- toward certain actors around the globe. Now is not the time to dismiss the legitimate political demands of terrorist groups aiming to enfranchise themselves in a larger, more stable political process, and to proclaim unilaterally the death of terrorism. Now is the time to continue the crackdown on Al Qaeda while working to trim down their base of support and their capacity to recruit by seriously reconsidering the way we act on the international stage-- that is an effort which will not only lead (hopefully) to the demise of Al Qaeda, but also to a peaceful and stable environment in Palestine.

Concerning Pakistan, however, it is not entirely possible to bridge the gaps, nor is it necessarily plausible to even talk of such things, until a large variety of internal factors work themselves out, and that is another discussion entirely. As for Pakistan, the most that the United States can do is to continue funding (while monitoring the appropriation and application of that funding) in support of stability, and to address the issues of Afghanistan and Pakistan as inter-related and at times conjoined.