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Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Rethinking Histories and Possibilities in US Grand Strategy

1/24/2012

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TRESTON WHEAT - 25 JANUARY 2012

Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Acts of War and America’s Responses

Introduction

Contrary to popular opinion, the world has not changed since September 11, 2001. All that is different is that Americans became aware of the animosity the rest of the world feels to the United States. Two stories from the twentieth century illustrate this. The first happened on September 6, 1901: the assassination of President William McKinley. Leon Czolgosz shot the President twice at the Pan-American Exposition after McKinley had been shaking hands with the people there. Although it appeared the President might recover from the bullet that ravaged his internal organs, he died a little over a week later. Czolgosz was an anarchist influenced by the ideas of anarchist Emma Goldman. His goal was the elimination of the US government. The second story happened almost a century later. Ramzi Yousef, an Islamist and the nephew to Khalid Sheik Mohammad, wanted to commit terrorism against the United States. On February 26, 1993, he and Eyad Ismoil drove a truck with over 1,300 lbs of fertilizer in the parking garage of the World Trade Center. Their goal was to blow up the base of the North Tower and knock it onto the South Tower; he wanted to kill tens of thousands of people. Luckily only six people died. His motivation was America’s support of Israel and the removal of American intervention in the Middle East. On September 11 al-Qaeda acted in the same way terrorists for the last century have. The destruction of the US government, American-Israeli relations, and American’s involvement in the Middle East motivated the hijackers. Furthermore, they were not the first to try and bring down the Twin Towers. Nothing has changed.

Historicizing Sub-State Violence in America

America has dealt with what academics call sub-state violence since the beginning of the 19th century. Thomas Jefferson, and later James Madison, had to deal with the Barbary pirates. The two presidents responded by sending the US navy to swiftly deal with the Barbary states, which were quasi-independent powers in the Ottoman Empire. Later in the 1800’s, America had to deal with the Civil War. Although this conflict is often characterized as a war between two state actors, the Federal government of the United States did not consider the Confederacy to be a legitimate government. For Abraham Lincoln, the Confederacy would be what people call sub-state actors today. A little known set of cases during the Civil War actually greatly affects the conceptualization of how Americans should view the War on Terror. The Supreme Court decided the Prize Cases in 1863 because President Abraham Lincoln blockaded the Confederacy without a formal declaration of war. The Supreme Court ruled “[a] state of actual war may exist without any formal declaration of it by either party, and this is true of both a civil and a foreign war.”[1] Furthermore, the Court ruled that “[t]o create this and other belligerent rights as against neutrals, it is not necessary that the party claiming them should be at war with a separate and independent power.”[2] The Prize cases established a legalist paradigm on how Americans should view war with sub-state actors.

            On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda operatives attacked the United States by flying planes into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. However, even before those attacks, al-Qaeda was at war with the United States. Osama bin Laden released a fatwa in 1996 titled “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Place.”[3] In the fatwa he writes:   “Today your brothers and sons, the sons of the two Holy Places, have started their Jihad in the cause of Allah, to expel the occupying enemy from of the country of the two Holy places…And as you know, it is wise, in the present circumstances, for the armed military forces not to be engaged in a conventional fighting with the forces of the crusader enemy…unless a big advantage is likely to be achieved; and great losses induced on the enemy side (that would shaken (sic) and destroy its foundations and infrastructures) that will help to expel the defeated enemy from the country.”[4]

A fatwa is a religious declaration by someone within the ulema, religious scholars of Islam. Whether Osama was allowed to deliver a fatwa is nugatory. What is important is that he declared war against America, which means the US and al-Qaeda were in a state of war according to the Prize Cases even though America did not offer a formal declaration. America did not need to declare war for the country to be drawn into one.

Second, al-Qaeda is a sub-state actor; however, there does not need to be a legitimate government to create a state of war. As the Supreme Court ruled, the US could be at war with someone who is not a “separate and independent power.” This is usually the part of contention between those who say terrorism is an act of war verses those who say it is merely a crime. The Prize Cases settle this in a legal sense, although someone may disagree with the principle in theory. Yet, in the American context, the precedent set by United States law is that when a sub-state actor attacks the legitimate authority then the state is at war. This broad historical analysis establishes the framework that politically motivated sub-state violence has been and will always be an act of war. However, every particular case is different and deserves a different response.

How to fight the war…

Usually after establishing that terrorism is an act of war, academics or policy makers follow through with the “logical” step of saying the military needs to respond. However, even though terrorism is an act of warfare, this does not necessarily mean that a military response is necessary. Each case is specific and needs a specialized response. It would be reckless to send the military after an individual terrorist, but it would be more appropriate to use them against an international terrorist threat. People cannot generalize about terrorists and respond to them in the same way. As previously demonstrated, there is a long history of sub-state violence in and against America. Each time, the United States did not respond the same every time; a specified approach is necessary to deal with the threat of terrorism.

In response to individual terrorism, the United States has a tradition of responding with a trial and punishment. The previous mentioned case of Leon Czolgosz is an example from the 20th century, and Nidal Malik Hassan is an example from the 21st. Nine days after Czolgosz attempted to kill the president, he went on trial, and the prosecution finished their case in two days. He was found guilty and received the death penalty a little over a month later. Hassan was a soldier in the US military, who for[C1]  religiously motivated reasons, opened fire against his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood while yelling “Allahu Akbar.”[5] He killed 13 people and wounded dozens of others before being brought down. At the end of November and beginning of December, the government began the proceedings to try Hassan. He has a trial coming in March. For individual terrorists, it is not necessary to respond with military action. Although it was a soldier who stopped Hassan, and civilians who stopped Czolgosz, the two just needed to be put on trial for their crimes.

Compare this to America’s response to September 11. After al-Qaeda brought down the Twin Towers andattacked the Pentagon, America went after the terrorists in Afghanistan with military force. This was necessary because the Taliban, the government of Afghanistan, shielded al-Qaeda from receiving justice. The United States needed to intervene in the country to neutralize the threat of al-Qaeda. This should raise the question as to why the two responses differ. Hassan and Czolgosz were individual terrorists, while al-Qaeda was an international terrorist organization that had cells throughout the world and the protection of a government. The only appropriate responses to the former examples were trials, while the latter needed a military response to bring down the Taliban and pursue al-Qaeda in the mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

These are not the only two responses to terrorism available, though. If America wants to stop terrorism, then the country needs to have an honest assessment of how to stop it. Contrary to the popular conception of the FBI or CIA stopping the terrorists in the nick of time, the vast majority of terrorist attacks are not thwarted that way. According to the Institute for Homeland Security Solution, “More than 80% of foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations from law enforcement or the general public. Tips included reports of plots as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, para-military training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents.”[6] Roughly 40% of the cases of thwarted terrorism happened because of public awareness or informants sharing information.[7] Intelligence is another response to terrorism and trying to interdict the attacks.

Restructuring the System

Fundamentally, this will need a systemic and philosophical restructuring of how the government deals with terrorism. This shift will have to be similar to how America reorganized itself after World War II with the creation of the National Security Council, CIA, and the Department of Defense. The current war against radical jihadists and other types of terrorists is unlikely to go away in the foreseeable future. Therefore, America’s national security apparatus needs to create a multilevel response with a combination of hard and soft power. First, the FBI and local police forces need to continue and extend their intelligence gathering abilities. Before September 11, the FBI was primarily a force to collect evidence and prosecute criminals within the country. After the terrorist attacks, the government forced intelligence gathering upon the institution. A possible restructuring is to build up a part of the FBI to resemble the gendermaries of European countries, which would require specific training for agents and analysts to work to interdict terrorism more than just collecting evidence. This would be a para-military part of the government rather than either military or police. A model America could utilize is Britain’s MI5, which is the country’s internal security force. MI5 had great amount of success against both the Provisional IRA and the Real IRA. Along these lines, the government needs to decide if terrorists will be tried in military or civilian courts. Currently, if a terrorist is tried in a military court, the FBI has to hand over all their intelligence to the military and is no longer part of the process. This causes turf wars, frustration, and competition. Another restructure would involve allowing the FBI to still collect the intelligence, and for the Department of Justice to stilltry the terrorist, whether it is in civilian court or military tribunal. The Department of Justice would need a special department of military lawyers who could work with the FBI and bring individual terrorists to trial.

Next, America needs to reconsider how it engages in diplomacy within the State Department. Traditionally, the State Department conducted foreign policy within the Westphalian system. Foreign ministers would meet with other foreign ministers and reach conclusions. However, in this conflict, sub-state actors are equally important as state actors. The new approach should allow the Secretary of State and Ambassadors to negotiate and talk with sub-state actors, including organizations that are considered the enemy like the Taliban. More diplomatic power will allow possibly peaceful ends to the conflict with certain terrorist organizations. Here, Britain is another good example with the IRA. Eventually the British government came to a settled agreement with a sub-state actor to end a decades long war between the IRA and the UK. Finally, because this is a war, America should always be ready to utilize military force. This does not always mean invading another country with a battalion; it could simply mean the use of Reaper drones to neutralize a terrorist in a foreign country or a special operations team like the one that eliminated Osama bin Laden. Yet, the option of a full military operation needs to always be available if the terrorist threat reaches international proportions, like in Afghanistan. This last option needs to only be used when there is a danger large enough to threaten American interests abroad. A combination of intelligence gathering, police work, diplomacy, and military action, both hard and soft power, are necessary to interdict, stop, or remove a terrorist threat.

Conclusion

The varying cases of terrorism throughout American history necessitate that the US consider the nature of terrorism and how to respond to it when it occurs. Terrorists do not always act in the same way and have different organizational structures. There are “lone wolves” like Hassan and Czolgosz, cells like those lead by Ramzi Yousef, and international ones like al-Qaeda. America should be ready to handle each type of case differently and should not respond dogmatically to acts of terrorism. A static approach will ultimately fail in the end because the same solution cannot always work. America needs to use a combination of tools available, including trials, interrogation, intelligence, local communities, informants, and military action when necessary. The counter-terrorism establishment needs to be reasonable and flexible in how it tries to stop and prevent terrorism in the homeland and abroad.

[1] Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 2 Black 635 (1862)

[2] Ibid.

[3] Osama bin Laden’s fatwa, originally published in Al-Quds Al Arabi, Aug. 1996: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html

[4] Ibid.

[5] Fort Hood Soldier: I ‘started doing what I was trained to do.’ Nov. 9, 2009: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-11-09/justice/fort.hood.foster_1_gen-robert-cone-nidal-malik-hasan-soldier?_s=PM:CRIME

[6] Institute for Homeland Security Solution, Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terror Plots, 1999-2009. Oct. 2010, pg. 1:  https://www.ihssnc.org/portals/0/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf

[7] Ibid.

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Framing the War on Terror

8/27/2011

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27 AUGUST 2011 - KRISTIN BUDD - The framing of the War on Terror under the Bush administration as an intentional domestic policy used to transform and influence US foreign policy.


Framing is a central organizational idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding sequence of events and that weaves a connection among them.  It also suggests what the controversy is about, giving the heart of the issue.  Framing includes the process of emphasizing and omitting information in a story so that the media can form the events into a dramatic or twisted story to attract and influence an audience.  In my opinion, American journalists frame the war on terrorism in a biased way that portrays the events as patriotic and positive for the United States.

            The catchphrase “War on Terror”, coined by the Bush administration shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, set a retaliatory tone in order to validate homeland security policies and rationalized military involvement in the Middle East.  In the Washington Post Katrina vanden Heuvel wrote that President Bush consciously used this phrase to frame the fight as “war” against our attackers.  President Obama said in a public address that framing the event in this light destroyed any hope of unity (vanden Heuvel).  Shortly after bin Laden’s demise, however, Obama framed the killing as the “end of war” when, in fact, it significantly advanced the fight against terrorism but did not end the war.  During his address, Obama also brought back the emotion from 9/11 in order to make the American audience feel unified and give justification for continuing the war (vanden Heuvel). 

            Such overarching themes phrased by governmental officials strongly coerce the news media to quickly pick up on implications without questioning their accuracy.  Journalists immediately frame news coverage in the same vein as politicians.  After 9/11, journalists took the lead from President Bush’s rhetoric to frame revenge against our attackers as the War on Terror. Their news coverage not only swayed public opinion to believe in our country’s mission but also brought about changes to public policy.  In her article, “Terrorism as a Context of Coverage Before the Iraq War”, Amy Fried wrote that Time’s and Newsweek’s coverage of Iraq policy was framed by the 9/11 context, as well as stories about terrorism in general.  As an example, Fried pointed out that news magazine articles used photographs and graphics that linked Iraq to terrorism. As Table 1 shows, the September 16 cover stories about Iraq were preceded by cover stories about 9/11 and then followed by a Time September 23 cover about al Qaeda terrorists. Newsweek’s cover story on September 23 emphasized Iraq, with the title ‘How We Helped Create Saddam and Can We Fix Iraq after He’s Gone?’ with a large picture of Saddam Hussein’s face taking up most of the cover.  Just before the cover story, a four-page photo spread focused around September 11 commemorations, including flags, a kneeling police officer at Ground Zero, flowers, and President Bush’s words from his speech of commemoration, with the quote ‘What our enemies have begun, we will finish’ (Fried). This biased display of photojournalism promoted patriotism and drew on people’s emotions from the 9/11 attack to ensure that the American people would stand behind the war. Newsweek decided to depict the coverage in this light to show that the devastating effects of 9/11 justified the fight with Iraq and the hatred of Saddam Hussein. 

            As another example, Hetherington and Nelson indicated in “The Anatomy of a Rally Effect,” that President Bush quickly took advantage of the “rally-around-the-flag effect” to promote American patriotism and increase his falling approval rating.  The media promoted his image as positive by framing news coverage to endorse our government’s mission to fight terrorism because the President believed that Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that would obliterate America.  The news media framed their news coverage by reporting that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction without ample investigation.  Fried pointed out that people simply assumed that Iraq possessed these weapons because media coverage reported a declaration of war on Iraq and Saddam Hussein to protect Americans from total obliteration. Fried wrote, “Both news magazines used graphics that strongly implied that Iraq posed a threat to U.S. national security” (Fried).  In reality, the media wanted to show that Iraq posed a threat and skirted the issue with implications rather than reporting actual facts (Fried). 

The media has also chosen to pacify the American people by portraying our military in a positive light.  In The Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, Schwalbe wrote that the media dramatically reports war by appealing to visual senses through photographs, videos, graphics, icons, and maps.  News articles are framed to influence audience reaction to news about the war and provide an accounting of the war for those who are not there (Schwalbe et al.).  The media selectively chooses what to show about the war in order to censor negative information in favor of facts that cause audiences to see the war in a positive light.  For example, the media shows positive images of U.S. soldiers helping people in Iraq instead of photos that portray U.S. bombing of innocent Iraqi civilians. 

            To further appease Americans, the media often depicts Arabs as the enemy and creates an image in the minds of American citizens that Arabs are violent.  Most journalists on the battlefield in this war have chosen to omit footage of the casualties of war and innocent people dying in favor of showing more images of soldiers helping the local citizens than in any previous US war.  The media and our government censor news coverage by choosing not to frame war stories in a negative light in order to justify starting and continuing the war.  In her article, Schwalbe concluded by following the footsteps of previous scholars, and realizing that television journalists are more likely to report war news in a positive manner.  In addition, she wrote that both the Associated Press and U.S. newspapers choose biased reporting by framing anti-war demonstrators in a negative light while associating pro-war demonstrators with harmony (Schwalbe et al).

            In contrast to the philosophy of American journalists, Al Jazeera, the news station founded by the Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, reports supposedly unbiased news as an option to the government-run television that is popular throughout the Middle East.  Al Jazeera’s goal is to frame their news as truthful, fact-filled broadcasts about political events at the risk of threatening leaders in their own county.  The station claims to report uncensored news by showing actual footage of controversial events, such as the aftermath of bombings and prisoners of war to ensure that the public knows the truth (Control Room).

            When considering the impact journalists have on people when framing their stories, one might suggest they “dig a little deeper” for the truth in order to appropriately inform their public.  Unfortunately, it seems that the media frequently chooses to remain upbeat and selects the path to positive-light reporting.  In direct disagreement with this philosophy, news audiences have the right to complete, uncensored, and unbiased news so they can decide for themselves whether to believe or disbelieve what they hear or read.  It is not surprising that deep-thinking and probing American citizens look for alternative news sources and turn to Al Jazeera for what they hope to be the truth about the war with the Middle East, a pattern to which American news outlets have reacted in a most hostile manner.
WORKS CITED

Control Room.  Dir. Jehane Noujaim. Writers Jehane Noujaim and Julia Bacha. Noujaim Films, 2004. DVD (documentary)

Fried, Amy. "Terrorism as a Context of Coverage Before the Iraq War." Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics. 10.125-132 (2005): Print.

Gershkoff, Amy and Kushner, Shana. “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration's Rhetoric.” Perspectives on Politics, 3, pp 525-537.

Hetherington, Marc J. and Nelson, Michael.  “Anatomy of a Rally Effect:  George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism.”  PS: Political Science and Politics.  36. 1 (January 2003): 37-42.

Schwalbe et al. “Visual Framing of the Early Weeks of the U.S.-Led Invasion of Iraq: Applying the Master War Narrative to Electronic and Print Images” Journal of Broadcasting and Elextroni Media. (September 2008).

Vanden Heuvel, Katrina.  “A Chance to End the ‘War.” The Washington Post.  03 May 2011,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-chance-to-end-the-war/2011/05/03/AFugChgF_story.html


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    About the Authors: Foreign Policy

    Matthew Bishop is the founder of World Report and is conducting research in the history of political media in revolutions. He specializes in US foreign policy, Palestine/Israel, media politics, revolutions, and revolutionary politics

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